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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Estate of
JAMES JOHN LATSIS (sometimes known as "Latses' ')

No. 7954

Deceased.

PETITION OF APPELLANTS

PETITION FOR REHEARING
1. This Court on rehearif/a. holds that the October de-

that it afforded no notice
cree is unconditional
to bonafide purchasers of the conditions contained
in the February decree. This court erred in holding that Mrs. Latses, who had complete knowledge
of the conditions, was also protected by this decree.
2. On rehearing this Court reversed its first opinion
by assigning a different meaning to the word "refer''
than to the word "incorporate'' when in fact they are
synonymou~ When an order refers to an earlier conditional order, it is the same as incorporating the
earlier conditional order within itself.
3. This Court falls into the error Mr. Justice Wolfe
cautioned against in the estate of McLaren. Even
though the rights of heirs in their separate capaciSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ties as contracting parties could be put in issue in
a probate proceeding, process must be served on
the heirs to bring them before the Court. If no
process
is served upon them ' in their separate capa..
C1hes as contracting parties, they have not had their
day in Court and the October order would be a void
order.
4. The petition for final distribution did not invoke
the jurisdiction of the probate court on a matter
of probate, namely - distribution under the laws of
succession. Probate includes a determination of the
persons who by laws of succession are decreed to be
the distributees of the property of the decedent and
secondly an adjudication of the proportions or parts
which each has received upon the death of the ancestor. A probate proceeding is not completed until
these steps are taken.
This Court failed to accord the same dignity to
another decree of the probate court, namely - the
February decree which is itself a final judgment on
the matters there passed on by the Court. The
February decree could only be reversed in a direct
proeeeding for that purpose. To initiate such a direct
proceeding, service of citation upon the heirs is required. The statutory notice, held to be sufficient
in Barrette vs. Whitney is not such a notice a's meets
this requirement.
5. That the error set forth in the next preceding paragraph, raises a constitutional question under the due
process clause of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The property rights
vested hy a judgment of this Court in the February
decree are taken away from the non-resident heirs
without due process. The opinion of this Court on
rehearing holds that the February Court Order made
a binding agreement for the parties. The vested
contract right of the non-resident heirs, to receive
2
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their full distributive share of this estatP, was taken
from thmn without due process of law hy thP October decree.
6. EYen if thP Court adhere8 to its opinion that the
October order is a Yalid probate decree and conclusive, the non-resident heirs haYP pleaded a ean~e of
action for negligence against the admini~trators and
of fraud and collusion between the administrators
on the one hand and :J[rs. Latses as one of the heir:-;
on the other hand.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This preliminary statement is intended as background to the principles of law set forth in this Brief in
support for the petition for rehearing.
A proceeding in probate is a special proceeding and
the only types of decrees or judgments that are binding
are those which deal with "matters of probate." Originally probate courts would hear only probate matters in a
probate proceeding. The Utah Code has relaxed the rule
and permits a probate court to pass upon matters of
equitable jurisdiction which are not matters in probate.
The statutory notice provided for in a probate proceeding can give notice only of the matters in probate. Whenever matters other than matters in probate are brought
before the probate court, in order to provide due process
of law, it is necessary that process be served upon all
parties who are intended to be bound by the judgment in
the non-probate proceeding.
As applied to the Latses case, the petition which is
relied upon by Mrs. Latses as invoking the jurisdiction
of this court to make ''distribution" of the assets of this
3
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estate, was in fact a non-probate proceeding. This is
made fully apparent by a reading of the petition (R.107,
paragraph!~ 5 and 6). These two paragraphs show the
petition invoked the jurisdiction of the court to give
affect to a stipulation entered into between all of the
heirs, to divide the estate of the decedent, not according
to the statutes of ta descent, but in accordance with a
contract entered into by the heirs. To divide an estate
in a n1anner other than provided by the laws of succession (where the decedent does not leave a Will) constitutes a non-probate matter. 'rhe order which that petition gave rise to made no probate determination, it nowhere appearing in the order, the shares or the proportions of the estate which each of the heirs was entitled to
receive, according to the laws of succession. The only
matter which it purports to adjudicate is. the rights of
each of the heirs as contracting parties under the stipulation and F'ebruary order of the court and it is a nonprobate order and it is not a decree of "distribution."

POINT I.
THIS COURT ON REHEARING HOLDS THAT THE
OCTOBER DECREE IS UNCONDITIONAL BECAUSE
IT AFFORDED NO NOTICE 'TO BONAFIDE PURCHASERS
OF THE CONDITIONS CONTAINED IN THE FEBRUARY
DECREE. THIS COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MRS.
LATSES, WHO HAD COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE OF THE
CONDITIONS, WAS ALSO PROTECTED BY THIS DECREE.

When the former opinion was entered, Amici Curiae
had not submitted a Brief. Some of the attorneys represented Amici Curiae who actually were persons who
harl purchased real property from Virginia Latses, dis··
4
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tributee of this estate. These attorneys brought to the
attention of the Court the problems of such subsequent
purchasers of the real property of this estate and the
opinion on rehearing indicates that the Court had in
mind the rights of such subsequent purchasers and desired to protect the property rights which had heen acquired by these subsequent purchasers. The Court's seeond opinion concerns itself wholly with the right of
such subsequent purchasers and considers not at all the
substantive property rights of the immediate parties
to the probate proceeding.
Of all of the property affected by these probate
proceedings, Blackacre alone was sold. Greenacre, Whiteacre and Redacre still stand in the name of Mrs. Latses.
Agreeing fully with the rationale of the courts opinion,
we could understand why the October decree would protect the bonafide purchasers of Blackacre, but there are
no bonafide purchasers of Greenacre, Whiteacre and
Redacre. The rights of the non-resident heirs in Greenacre, Whiteacre and Redacre are not prejudiced by any
intervening rights of bonafide purchasers for value. If
it be conceded that the non-resident heirs have lost their
title insofar as Blackacre is concerned by reason of the
intervening rights of purchasers for value, still, they
have not lost their vested property rights in Greenacre,
Whiteacre and Redacre, which properties are still retained by Mrs. Latses and as to which properties, the
rights of bonafide purchasers for value are not involved.
Under the provisions of Section 75-14-16 UCA 53,
this Court could very well hold that the rights of suhse5
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quent purchasers for value are fully protected by the
October decree. That Statute reads:
"When a judgment or decree is made determining any matter affecting the title to property
a certified copy of the same must be recorded in
the office of the recorder of the county in which
the property is situated; and from the time of
filing the same notice of the contents thereof is
imparted to all persons."
Bonafide purchasers having constructive notice of
the October decree from the date of recording could rely
upon it and be protected by it. Thus, the purchaser of
Blackacre would be protected, but that statute would
not protect Mrs. Latses who had actual notice rather
than constructive notice of the fact that the distribution
to her was conditional upon the execution and delivery
to her of assignments of the interest of the non-resident
heirs and of the execution and delivery to her of releases
of their interests in the estate.
W respectfully submit to this Court that it should
be zealous to protect the interests of bonafide purchasers
who had no notice of the conditions, but that it should
not permit Mrs. Latses, who had full and complete notice
of the conditions to be complied with before she coulrl
acquire title, to profit from her own wrong. With full
knowledge of the fact that she was not entitled to have
all of the property of the estate, save $10,000.00 distributed to her, she nevertheless committed the wrong of
deeding the property over to herself. Mrs. Latses,, as
6
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co-ad1ninistrator of the estate is in a position of trust
and confidence to the heirs. As this Court has aptly
stated in Graham vs. Street, 166 Pac. 2d, 524 at 536 "Equity will not allow a party in a relationship of trust and
confidence, to profit fron1 his own wrong." She must
not be per1nitted to keep Greenacre, Whiteacre and Redacre ~he should be required to transfer to the nonresident heirs, their respective undivided interests.
This Court should again examine the petition filed
to initiate the proceeding now before this Court. The
facts there set forth are the reasons why this court
should not attempt to decide the rights as between Mrs.
Latses and the heirs, without having before it an of the
evidence that will be adduced. This Court should have
before it full and complete evidence as to the value of
the property left by the decedent. ·This Court should
take judicial knowledge of the fact that the appraisement made, both for the County inventory and for the
State Inheritance Tax inventory, are not the same values
that would be established in an adversary proceeding.
The last item in the estate tax inventory (R 81) is a
mortgage executed by Peter Latses and Hattie Latses,
to secure a note in the amount of $6,000.00 together with
interest. This note is valued in the inventory at $9,67000. Six days after the October decree was entered, a
release of a mortgage was executed by Virginia Latses.
This release was given to Peter Latses one of the heirs
who accepted $2500.00 in payment of hi's interest in the
estate. Evidence will be adduced to show that this re-

7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

lease of mortgage was given without any monetary consideration. A certified copy of this release of mortgage,
Instrument 1063725 in the Office of the County Recorder
of Salt Lake County, is being filed with the record before
this Court.
It is respectfully submitted that with the full facts
before this Court, a complete and equitruble disposition
could be made of this case.
POINT II.
ON REHEARING THIS COURT REVERSED ITS FIRST
OPINION BY ASSIGNING A DIFFERENT MEANING TO
THE WORD "REFER" THAN TO THE WORD "INCORPORATE" WHEN IN FACT THEY ARE SYNONYMOUS. WHEN
AN ORDER REFERS TO AN EARLIER CONDITIONAL
ORDER, IT IS THE SAME AS INCORPORATING THE
EARLIER CONDITIONAL ORDER WITHIN ITSELF.

The rationale of the Court's reversal of its original
opinion is expressed in the single sentence: "Since the
order here in question fails to put the inquirer upon
notice that there are conditions precedent to its becoming
final, it demands the respect to which a final decree is
entitled under the statute."
The Court finds the fact which is acknowledged by
all the parties, that the earlier order of February 27,
1945 does contain conditions. In the second paragraph
of the opinion the Court states, "Upon rehearing our
attention is called to the fact that the 'Order Approving
Final Accounting and Distribution' does refer to the
earlier order containing conditions .... "
This Court states that it "reaffinns the principles

8
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of law stated in its first opinion" and continues '"Though
we need make no modification in the legal principles
enunciated, we find it necessary to reconsider our con·
struction of the facts." The Court proceeds with this
process which it denominates "a construction of the
facts" and concludes that the Order Approving Final
Accounting "does refer to the earlier order containing
conditions." In its original opinion the Court concluded
that the Order Approving Final Accounting "incorporates a prior conditional order". Upon this untenable
peg hands a diametrically opposite decision. This Court
is holding that whereas notice is given when an order
"incorporates by reference" a previous order that notice is lacking when the subsequent order only "refers"
to a previous order. This Court has taken a single well
recognized legal phrase, divided it into two parts and
assigned wholly different meaning and results to the
constituent words of the phrase. lt seems to us that notice is given regardless of whether the previous order is
incorporated into a subsequent order by setting it out
in haec verba or simply by referring to it. Each method
gives the same notice. To incorporate means to cause
to be "united in one body-to bodily insert". (To~edo
Railroad Company vs. Cupp, 8 Indiana Appeals 388, 35
Northeastern 703.) To refer is "to bring, carry, or send
back, as to refer a student to a book" (State vs. Iwnes,
89 Kansas 168, 130 Pacific 677 at 680.) Thus to refer
a person to a particular order is to carry back the person or his attention to that order. When one's attention
9
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is referred to an order, he is being given notice of the
contents of that order. The October Order refers to the
order containing conditions, and those conditions are
thus carried into the October 9, 1945 order.
We respectfully submit that the reasons assigned
by the Court to demonstrate that the October order is
unconditional do not support its conclusion. In fact the
Court's recognition of the fact that the "Order Approving Final Accounting.... does refer to the earlier
order containing conditions" lends weight to the propriety of its original opinion and militates against the
conclusion reached by the Court in its second opinion.
POINT III.
THIS ·COURT FALLS INTO THE ERROR MR. JUSTICE
WOLFE CAUTIONED. AGAINST IN THE ESTATE OF McLAREN. EVEN THOUGH THE RIGHTS OF HEIRS IN
THEIR SEPARATE CAPACITIES AS CONTRACTING PARTIES COULD BE PUT IN ISSUE IN A PROBATE PROCEEDING, PROCESS MUST BE SERVED ON THE HEIRS TO
BRING THEM BEFORE THE COURT. IF NO PROCESS IS
SERVED UPON THEM, IN THEIR SEPARATE .CAP ACITIES AS CONTRACTING PARTIES, THEY HAVE NOT HAD
THEIR DAY IN COURT AND THE OCTOBER ORDER
WOULD BE A VOID ORDER.

There is a great reluctance to file a petition fotr
rehearing after the court has granted one rehearing,
but our full duty to our client and to the court demands
our best efforts to demonstrate to this court that its
second opinion has fallen into the error which Mr. Just.ice Wolfe cautioned against in the case of, In re l\f cLaren's Estate, 90 Utah 340, 106 Pac 2d 766. Justice

10
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'Volfe·s op1n1on was referred to with approval by the
entire court in the case, In re Rice's Estate, 111 Utah,
182 Pac 2d 111.
A probate decree is conclusive only in so far as the
decree decides a step in a probate proceeding. The Utah
probate court states the several steps in a probate pro~
ceeding. Utah decisions permit non-probate matters to
be considered in a probate proceeding, but require that
process he served upon an heir, who is also a party to
the non-probate proceeding. The rule in Barrett.e vs.
Whitney, 36 Utah 574, 106 Pac. 532, concerning notice,
is not applicable when non-probate matters are before
the court in a probate proceeding.
In this case the petition (R 107) labeled as a petition for "distribution" is not a step in a probate proceeding. This may sound as a shocking and unrealistic
statement to the court at first blush.
In the course of this presentation, we expect to show:
1. That the petition for final distribution does not
plead the facts, looking to a "distribution" by virtue of
the laws of succession requiring a determination of heirship and the proportions or parts which each of the heirs
is entitled to receive under the laws of succession.
2. That on the contrary, it pleads a court approved
agreement and asks distribution according to the court
approved agreement in a manner other than required
by the law of succession.
3. That a proceeding for the approval of an agree11
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ment to provide for distribution in a manner other than
required by the laws of succession "is not a matter of
probate".
4. That since it is not a matter of probate, a citation must be served upon the persons to be affected by
that determination, in order to bring that person before
the court.
5. That the probate notice is not sufficient for this
purpose.
6. That an adjudication of the rights and obligations
of one of the parties to the court approved agreement,
even if he be an heir, without having a process served
upon him, is a void adjudication and judgment.
We shall undertake to de1nonstrate that the October
order is void because it violated the fundamental principle referred to by Mr. Justice Wolfe in the McLaren
case, namely - that there has been an adjudication of
title to property, in essence an equitable proceeding, by
an adjudication in a probate proceeding, without the
requisite personal service of a citation to secure the
appearance before the court, of the other heirs.
This court has held- (In re McLaren- ), supra
"There seems to be no reason, under our
Constitution and laws, why a district court in a
probate proceeding may not when necessary to a
due administration of an es,tate exercise poweri'
which ordinarily pertain to equity jurisdiction
so that the business may proceed without interruption or unnecessary delay"

12
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but J ustiee \Volfe continues- (page 773 of 106 P (2)
''But again, warning should be sounded regarding the situation where a civil case is tried
as a probate matter and probate matter tried as
a civil case when they are respectively purely
matters cognizable only as civil and as probate.
It is one thing to determine a civil matter as a
probate matter or a probate matter as a civil
case and quite another thing to try a probate
matter as a probate matter and a civil case as a
civil case, although they may be addressed to the
wrong divisions of the court. The first is a matter of substance; the second a matter of labels
and ministerial adjustment. An example of the
first class of cases would have been furnished if
judgment had gone against Aurelius McLaren in
the lower court when he was in a prooeeding in
which he was in a probate by reason of the fact
that he was an heir. The probate division by virtue of its jurisdiction of the estate and the heirs
for general purposes of administration could not
in probate proceedings wherein the party was
served by the mailing to him of a probate notice
of the contest, have given judgment against him
in a matter essentially civil in its nature."
Likewise, Mr. Justice Wolfe notes the difference
between a person being before the court as a heir and
as a party to an equitable proceeding- (pg 770)
"If the matter had gone against the assignee
it may be that he might have shown that he was
not personally served as required in a civil suit
and therefore had not his day in court. He was
served as an heir by a mailed probate notice, but
he was not served as a party. He, however, pre-

13
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vails and does not object that he was not properly in court as assignee. The appellant appeared personally, therefore he cannot object that he
did not have his day in court nor can he claim
a new trial because his successful adversary was
not properly served. The adversary adopts the
judgment in his favor as assignee by making no
objection and joining issue on appeal."
The probate court cannot, in the course of a probate
proceeding adjudicate a non-probate matter, depending
for its jurisdiction over the heirs, upon the probate forms
of notice, and without citing the heirs into court as parties, by serving a proper citation upon them.
"If in the course of probate and as a part
of the probate procedure the court should adjudicate controverted matters involving title the
result might not stand because probate is essentially in rem. But if the parties were all before
the court and the pleadings contained all the allegations necessary to invoke the jurisdiction to
try title and the court tried it as an action to
quiet title, the mere fact that it was captioned in
probate would not make the judgment invalid."
(R 9771.)
We apply this legal principle to this proceeding in
probate consisting of the PETITION FOR APPROVAL
OF FINAL ACCOUNT AND FOR DISTRIBUTION
AND THE ORDER APPROVING FINAL ACCOUNT
AND MAKING DISTRIBU'riON AND DISCHARGING ADMINIS-TRATOR ( R 125)
The petition for distribution did not present to the
court a matter of probate. That petition invoked the
jurisdiction of the court "to adjudicate controverted

14
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matters involving title," as Mr. Justice Wolfe states in
the :McLaren case. We shall hereafter discuss the allegations contained in the petition for distribution which
shows that the courts jurisdiction was not invoked upon
a matter of probate, but rather for a determination of
the title to property and the rights and obligations under
a contract between ~Irs. Latses and the other heirs. Assuming, for the moment, that the matter passed upon
was not a matter of probate and the record failed to disclose that process was served upon the heirs citing them
to appear before the court to have the matter of title
adjudicated, the October orderfili entered would be a void
order for the reasorl:rthe three heirs did not have their
day in court.
"Upon death title to property of which the de~~dent
died possessed, immediately passes to and vested ~ the
heirs subject to the administration and payment of
debts," Chamberlain v. Larsen, 83 Utah 420, 29· Pac.
2d 355. Section 74-4-2 UCA 53, is the statutory recognition of this principle. Our court has further held that
title vests in the heirs "subject to divestment for debts
and expenses," Jones v. St~ate Tax Commission, 99 Utah
373, 104 Pac. 2d 210.
"The purpose of an adjudication of heirship is not
to vest title, hut to adjudicate where the title of the decedent has already vested." Chamberlaitn v. Larson at
page 351, 29 Pac. 2d. One of the two steps of "distribution" is to determine heirship. In the Latses case, no
proceeding was taken to adjudicate where the title of
the decedent had already vested. This involves more
15
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than merely naming the persons who are heirs, because
that alone determines nothing as to where the title has
vested. To properly determine heirship, the proportions
or parts which each heir as an heir has received, must
be adjudicated.
A decree of distribution is supposed to only declare
a title and not create a title. However, the decree of
distribution in this case created a title different from the
title to the property established by the laws of succession. This attempted adjudication of title cannot stand
and is a void judgment because the persons being divested of the title were never personally served. In the
case In re Ric·e's Estate, supra, the court recognized that
its jurisdiction over the persons was acquired because
the persons volWltarily submitted to the jurisdiction of
the court. In the Latses case, the only notice given of
the petition for the approval of the final account, as set
forth in the record at page 105, is the ordinary ten day
notice given in probate proceedings. No notice of this
hearing was served upon the Attorney for the nonresident heirs. Accordingly, if, as we trust we can demonstrate in the next sub-heading, that this petition invoked the jurisdiction of the court on a matter involving the contract rights of the heirs, then the order is
void.
The order of distribution must be an order determining what property the law has cast upon each heir. The
situation is analogous to the principle as to the relief
which may be granted when a complaint is filed. When a
complaint is filed and a summons served on a defendant,
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the judgn1ent entered cannot go beyond the allegations
of the complaint which has been served on the defendant.
If the defendant fails to appear when the summons is
served upon him, the judgment taken against him is
lin1ited to the 1natters set forth in the complaint. Similarly, in a probate, the original notice (which according
to Barrette v. Whitney is sufficient to give the probate
court jurisdiction) only involves the heirs that were
being sun1moned before the court for all matters in probate. The heirs are justified in assuming that only
matters of probate will be passed upon in that proceeding. The ultimate end of a probate proceeding in a case
of intestate succession is to adjudicate the two facts as
to - No. 1. \Vhat persons have succeeded to the property of the decedent, No. 2. What property the law of succession has cast upon each heir. If the heirs wish to
enter into agreements to divide the property in a manner
different than provided by the laws of succession, they
have the right to enter into such a contract. Before courts
pennitted non-probate matters to be tried in a probate
proceeding, this agreement if controverted would have
been the subject of an independent action. With the
break down of the rule limiting probate proceedings to
strictly probate matters and permitting adjudication
of non-probate matters in a probate proceeding, such
agreement of the heirs could be considered in a probate
proceeding. However, when so considered, as stated in
the case In re McLaren, it is necessary that process be
served on the heirs in their new capacity as contracting
parties.
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In order to make clear the application of this principle to the Latses estate, it is necessary to set forth
the provisions of the Utah Probate Code, setting forth
the steps in probate and secondly, to review the proceedings in the Latses case to establish the fact that the proceedings taken were non-probate in character and therefore not binding in a case where process was not served
upon the heirs who were necessary parties to the nonprobate proceeding.
POINT IV.
THE PETITION FOR FINAL DISTRIBUTION DID NOT
INVOKE THE JURISDICTION OF THE PROBATE COURT
ON A MATTER OF PROBATE, NAMELY-DISTRIBUTION
UNDER THE LAWS OF SUCCESSION. PROBATE INCLUDES A DETERMINATION OF THE PERSONS WHO
BY LAW OF SUCCESSION ARE DECREED TO BE THE
DISTRIBUTEES OF THE PROPERTY OF THE DECEDENT
AND SECONDLY AN ADJUDICATION OF THE PROPORTIONS OR PARTS WHICH EACH HAS RECEIVED UPON
THE DEATH OF THE ANCESTOR. A PROBATE PROCEEDING IS NOT COMPLETED UNTIL THESE STEPS ARE
TAKEN.

The last order in this case dated October 9, 1945 did
not complete these probate proceedings. The petition
upon which this order is based did not invoke the jurisdiction of the Court to make distribution in accordance
with Section 75-12-7 and the decree does not fulfill the
requirements of Section 75-12-8 in order to make it binding on all parties as directed by Section 75-12-9.
The case In r.e Evans 42 Utah 282 130 Pacific 217:
''A decree of distribution in probate proceedings, after due and legal notice by a Court
having jurisdiction of the subject matter is con-
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elusive as to the fund, items, and matters covered
by and properly included within the decree until
set aside or modified by the Court entering the
decree in the manner prescribed by law or until
reversed on appeal."
See also In re Rice's Estate, 111 Utah 428, 182 P. (2)
111.
It is our contention that the alleged decree of distribution is in fact not a decree of distribution but a
transfer of property by way of partition or a transfer of
property as the result of an alleged contract between the
heirs. The alleged distribution is not in conformity with
the fundamental law set forth in the Probate Code and,
therefore, it is a nullity. In re Evans supra at page 266
of 130 Pacific:
"A fact apparent from the mandatory record
showing that fundamental law was disregarded
in the establishment of the judgment will render
it null and void for all purposes. And a judgment
founded upon such a record is subject both to
direct and collateral attack, and will, sua sponte,
be noticed by Courts and acted upon by them
without regard to the wishes or the relation of
the parties named upon the record."
By setting out the applicable statutes which a probate
proceeding must follow, we hope to demonstrate to this
Court that the alleged decree of distribution is void.
Section 74-4-1. Succession is the coming in
of another to take the property of one who dies
without disposing of it by will.
It should be particularly noted here that succession
does not include the vesting of property as a result of

19
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

contract. Quarles v. Clayton, 87 Tenn. 308, Tenn. S.W.
505, 3 LRA 170:
"The word 'succession' is a word of technical
meaning, and refers to those who by descent or
will take the property of a decedent. It is a word
which clearly excludes those who take by deed,
grant, gift, or any form of purchase or contract."
The rules of succession in this State are set forth in
Section 74-4-5 which reads :
"When any person having a title to an estate
... dies without disposing of the estate by will,
it is succeeded to and must be distributed, unless
otherwise expressly provided in this title or in
the Probate Code . . . in the following manner:
(3) If the decedent leaves no issue, all of the estate, real or personal, of which the decedent died
seized or possessed, of not over $25,000 in value
exclusive of debts and expenses, goes to the
surviving husband or wife; and if over that value,
$25,000 in value thereof goes to the surviving husband or wife and the other half to the decedent's
father and mother, in equal shares, and if either
is dead, the whole of said half goes to the other;
if there is no father or mother, then one-half of
such excess goes in equal shares to the brothers
and sisters of the decedent, and to the children or
grandchildren of any deceased brother or sister
by right of representation:"
The only exception where distribution may be made
in a manner other than as set forth in Section 74-4-5
appears in Section 74-12-15 which allows real estate to be
distributed to the grantees of heirs. That Section reads:
"Partition or distribution of the real estate
may be made as provided in this chapter, although
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some of the original heirs, legatees or devisees
may have conveyed their shares to other persons,
and such shares must be assigned to the persons
holding the same in the same manner as they
otherwise would have been to such heirs, legatees
or devisees."
(There may be a second exception set forth in Section 712-9 on the subject matter of advancements made, which
we should refer to later in connection with our discussion
of the case of In re Howard's Estate, 159 Pacific 2d 586
(Utah).)
The foregoing statutes outline the only means by
which property of an intestate is succeeded to. Section
75-1-6 states "that the Judges of District and 'Supreme
Court setting in probate matters shall exercise all such
powers cons~tent with the provisions of this title, as are
or may be conferred upon those Courts or Judges respectively in other proceedings."
This is the only source of the power ~ jurisdiction
of the Judge of the Probate Court: "The source of the
administrator's power and that of the Probate Court
must be found in the Probate Code. In re Harris Estate,
99 Utah 464, 105 Pacific 2d 461. The Sections of the
Probate Code outlining the procedure by which these
powers of the Probate Court are exer'cised and which
are material.._. are here set out. S.ection 75-12-7:
"Section 75-12-7: Upon the final settlement
of the accounts of the executor ... upon the petition of the administrator or of any heir, legatee,
or devisee, and upon notice the Court must proceed to distribute the residue of the estate in the
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hands of the executor or administrator an1ong the
persons who, by law, are entitled thereto;
''Section 75-12-8: In the order or decree the
Court must name the persons and the proportions
or parts to which each shall be entitled, and such
persons may demand and sue for and recover their
respective shares from the executor or administrator or any person having the same in possession."
As an addendum to Section 75-12-9 our statutes state
the result of the entry of a decree, if the statutes are complied with, and that result is set forth in these words:
"and the final judgment or decree of the
Court is binding on all parties interested in the
estate, subject only to be reversed, modified, or
set aside on appeal."
In a probate proceeding only matters of probate may
be determined and it shall be our function to show that
in this case the necessary matters of probate have not yet
been determined but that what is purported to be determined is something which is beyond the jurisdiction of
the Probate Court, namely, to decide the relative rights
of persons who happen to be heirs of an estate based upon a contract entered into by those heirs.
As to the matters which may be heard on a petition
for distribution we quote from the Utah case In re
Howard's Estate, 159 Pacific 2d 586 at 590:
"This matter came before the Court on the
Executor's final account and for petition for distribution of the est.ate to the persons entitled to
receiv.e the same, and for release and discharge
of the executors. Proper notice was given on the
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filing and time for hearing of both the account
and the petition. This constituted notice not onlv
of the hearing of the account and the petition, but
of all issues and questions that might arise from
objections thereto. All matters involved therein
were before the Court for hearing and determination. Cases cited. Whether additional notice
should be given is a matter of discretion of the
Court below and in the absence of anything to
show abuse of such discretion Appellate Court
will not interfere. Cases cited. What matters
may be adjusted on such hearing~ In general, the
only items which can be properly settled in executor's account Ui matters relating purely to his
administration of the estate; payment of debts
and charges of administration; but upon the petition for distribution, the Court, in harmony with
its general equitable power, can hear and 'adjust
all matters between the executors and the legatees and distributees, and give the former credit
against the latter for all advances made to either
under the terms of the will.' DCA 1943, Section
102-12-9." (Note by appellant: This is the section
referred to in our brief above which we mentioned might also be an exception to the distribution
statutes permitting distribution to someone other
than the heirs.)
"Jurisdiction of 'matters of probate' includes
determinations of what persons succeeded to the
estate whether as devisees, legatees, and heirs
and the part of amount of the estate to which each
is entitled; Section 102-12-8 DCA 43 Martilnvich v.
Marsica;no, 137 Cal. 354 70 Pacific 459."
Several matters in this quote should be noticed. The
first is-that the petition which invokes the jurisdiction
of the Court is "A Petition for Distribution of the Estate
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to the persons entitled to receive the same." The petition filed in this case was a petition for transfer of the
assets to persons who claimed them under an antecedent
contract. The Probate Court has no jurisdiction to hear
a petition for the transfer of property to persons who
claim the property in any capacity other than as heir,
legatee, or devisee. It must not be thought that the rule
is any different because of the fact that the same persons
occupied the two separate relationships, namely, of heirs
on the one hand and contracting parties on the other
hand. See Parr v. Reyman, California, 12 Pacific 2d 440
at 442:
"In the other authority cited above it is pointed out that the 'Claimant was not an heir, legatee,
or devisee of the deceased and had obtained his
title during the pendency of the probate proceeding through a deed or other legal conveyance from
an heir, devisee, or legatee while in the present
action each of the parties to the deed from Virgil
to Willard was an heir of his deceased mother
and was properly before the Probate Court at
the time of the distribution of her estate.... "
In answering the contention that the rule was different when all of the parties were heirs of the estate and
before the Court, the California Supreme Court said:
"The second of the attempted differentiations between the cited cases and the present case
is equally unavailing. The quotes from the authorities cited above and the cases themselves
plainly show that the Probate Court has no jurisdiction over contracts or conveyances made by
heirs, devisees, or legatees, either among themselves or with others' " (the underlining is by the
Supreme Court of California in its decision).
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This case of Parr v. Reyman will be discussed in this
memorandum more fully in its course both through the
District Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of California.
In the case of In re H award, supra the Court is outlining what may be heard on a petition for distribution
of the estate to the persons entitled to receive the same.
The petition referred to is strictly a probate petition and
not as in the instant case a petition for transfer of all
but $10,000.00 of the estate to one heir of the estate who
claimed it by virtue of an alleged agreement and as a contracting party and not as an heir. It is evident that it is
not a petition for distribution because it does not meet
the definition of a petition for distribution. See Robifn..son v. Fair, 128 U.S. 53, 9 Supreme Court 30, 32 L. Edition 415:
"Distribution neither gives a new title to
property nor transfers a distinct right in the estate of the deceased owner, but is simply doolaratory as to the persons upon whom the law casts
the succession, and the extent of their respective
interests, while partition in most, if not all of its
aspects, is a adversary proceeding in which the
remedial right to the transfer of the property is
asserted, and resulting in a decree which either
ex proprio vigore or as executory accomplished
such transfer."
It is to he particularly noted that a petition such as
was filed in the instant case gives rise to an adversary
proceeding, separate and distinct from a matter in probate and, of course, a Probate Court does not have jurisdiction over these adversary proceedings excepting as
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granted by Statute. This Court has already held that the
proceeding did not attempt to comply with our statutory
requirements for partition. Accordingly, the petition presented to the Court allegedly as a petition for distribution in fact was not a petition for distribution but instead
asserted the rights of Mrs. Latses as a contracting party
to receive all of the assets of the estate save $10,000.00.
In the alleged petition for distribution Mrs. Latsis states
that she contracted to receive all of the estate save $10,000.
The petition and the order following it did not
name the persons and the proportions or parts which
each party was entitled to receive by law. The order
named only the amount which each person was entitled
to receive under and by virtue of an alleged contract.
The matters herein argued are fully presented in a
decision of the Courts of Oalifornia in the course of the
progress of the case of P.arr v. Reyman, supra, both
before the District Court of Appeals of California and
the Supreme Court of California. The first opinion is in
6 Pacific 2d 107. An opinion superseding the opinion by
the District Court of Appeals, was written by the Supreme Court of California and it appears at 12 Pacific
2d 440. In that case the question of the extent to which
a probate decree was conclusive was raised. California
has the same statute as our Section 75-12-8 and with an
addition similar to the portion which we quoted above
from Section 75-12-9 the California Statute in full reads
as follows:
"S.ection 1666 Code of Civil Procedure: In
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the order or decree th.3 Court must name the persons and proportions or parts to which each shall
be entitled and such person may demand, sue for
and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator or any person having the
same in possession. Such order or decree is conclusive as to the rights of heirs, legatees, or devis·ees, subject only to be reversed, set aside, or
modified on appeal."
When the case was before the District Court of Appeal
the Court in its decision made certain assumptions as to
what the record would show as to the decree of distribution. The District Court of Appeal held that the decree
was conclusive because the only record that was before
the Court indicated that the party to whom the property
was distributed received the property in his capacity
as heir of the estate rather than in his capacity as a contracting party. The Court made this assumption as
shown by the following statements of the Court taken
from 6 Pacific 2d 109 :
"This case is before us on the judgment rule
alone. It is, therefore, our duty to assume that
any and all evidence necessary to support the
judgment was introduced in the Court below.
There is nothing in the record that would tend to
indicate that the distribution to Willard A. Parr
in the decree in the estate of Elizabeth Parr, deceased, was made to him as a purchas:er of the
interest of his brother, Virgil, the appellant here."
When the matter came before the Supreme Court of
California it appeared that distribution was made to
one who was an heir of the decedent but who received
his interest in the estate by contract. The Supreme Court
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of California interpreted its Code provision on distribution which is the same as that of Utah and quoted from
an earlier case in California as follows:
12 Pacific 2d 441: "Section 1666, Code Civil
Proc., provides that a decree of distribution 'is
conclusive as to the rights of heirs, legatees, or
devisees;' but it is conclusive against them only
as heirs, legatees, or devisees, - only so far as
they claim in such capacities. The probate court
has jurisdietion to determine who are the legal
heirs of a deceased person who died intestate, and
who are the devisees or legatees of one who died
testate; but its determination of such matters
does not create any new title. It n1erely declares
the title which accrued under the law of descent,
or under the provisions of the will. The decree
of distribution has nothing to do with contracts
or CO'YIIV·eyances which may hav.e b,een made by
heirs, devis.ees, or legatees of or about their
shares of the estate, either among themselv·es or
with others. Such matters are not before the probate court, and over them it has no jurisdiction.
An heir may contract about or convey the title
which the law had cast upon him on the death of
his ancestor; and the validity of force of such contract is not affected by the fa:ct that a probate
court afterwards, by its decree of distribution, declares his asserted heirship and title to be valid."
Our courts have in innumerable cases affirmed
this do~trine. Estate of Burton, 93 Cal. 459, 461,
29 P. 36; Estate of Brudick, 112 Cal. 387, 391,
44 P. 734; Estate of Crooks, 125 Gal. 4·59, 58 P.
89; Martinovich v. Marsicano, 137 Cal. 354, 356,
70 P. 459; Estate of Ryder, 141 Cal. 366, 74 P. 993;
Cooley v. Miller & Lux, 156 Cal. 510, 105 P. 981;
Estate of Howe, 161 Cal. 152, 118 P. 551; Estate
of Lyon 163 Cal. 803, 127 P. 75; Archer v. Harvey,
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16-! Cal. 27-1, 128 P. --UO; Shaw v. Paln1er, 65 Cal.
App. -!41, 22-! P. 106.
In the case of Martinovich v. Marsicano,
supra, this court stated the law applicable to the
question now under discussion as follows:
'' 'Matters of probate' include the ascertainment
and determination of the persons who succeed
to the estate of a decedent, either as heir, devisee,
or legatee, as well as the amount of proportion
of the estate to which each is entitled, and also the
construction or effect to be given to the language
of a will; but do not include a determination of
claims against the heir or devisee for his portion
of the estate arising subsequent to the death of
the ancestor, whether such claim arises by virtue
of his contact or in invitum; nor is the determination of conflicting claims to the estate of an heir
or devisee, or whether he has conveyed or assigned his share of the estate a 'matter of probate.'"
(2, 3) An attempt is made to distinguish
the line of authorities just cited from the present
case. In the first place, it is contended that the
appellant in this action is not claiming under
the decree of distribution but adversely to it,
while in certain of the authorities relied upon
above the claimant is a grantor 'Claiming under a
decree of distribution advers~ly to the terms of
his prior grant. In the other authorities cited
above it is pointed out that the claimant was not
an heir, legatee, or devisee of the deceased, and
had obtained his title during the pendency of the
probate proceeding through a deed or other legal
conveyance from an heir, devis·ee, or legatee,
while in the present action each of the parties
to the deed from Virgil to Willard was an heir
of his deceased mother, and was properly before
the probate court at the time of the distribution
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of her estate. As to the first of these attempted
differentiations between this case and the authorities cited, we are unable to see any difference
in principle, in so far as the question of the conclusive effect of a decree of distribution is concerned between parties where the grantor is
claiming under a decree of distribution notwithstanding his grant deed divesting himself of all
interest in the estate, and a grantor claiming adversely to the decree of distribution, which distributes the property conveyed by him in accordance with the terms of his grant. It is claimed
that in cases where a grantor is 'Claiming under a
decree of distribution adversely to his deed, they
might have rested upon the broad principle of
law that a grant deed passes subsequently aquired
title. Admitting for the present purpose that
those cases might have been so decided, the decisions therein show that they were not. The decisions rested upon another equally well-recognized
principle of law that the probate court has no
jurisdiction over "contracts or conveyances which
may have been made by heirs, devisees, or legatees, of or about their shares of the estate, either
among themselves or with others. Such matters
are not before the probate court, and over them it
has no jurisdiction." Chever v. Ching Hong Poy,
supra. ·or, as was said in Martinovich v. Marsciano, supra, "'Matters of probate' * * * do not
include a determination of claims against the heir
or devisee for his portion of the estate arising
subsequent to the death of the ancestor, whether
such claim arises by virtue of his contract or in
invitum. * * *"
The second of the attempted differentiations
between the cited cases and the present case is
equally unavailing. The quotations from the au30
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thorities cited above and the cases themselves
plainly show that the probate court has no jurisdiction over contracts or conveyances made by
heirs devisees, or legatees, "either among themselves or with others."
Thus, in the decision of this case before the District
Court of Appeal of California and the 'Supreme Court of
the State of California we find a history which is the
reverse of the history of the instant case before this
Court. The second opinion of this court in effect follows
the District Court of Appeal of California and the original opinion in its result, if not in its reasoning, follows
the Supreme Court of California. It should be noted
here that Section 75-12-15 UCA 53 does give jurisdiction
to the Probate Court to distribute property to persons
other than the heirs only when there is a valid conveyance made in conformity with the requirements of the
statutes transferring the interest of an heir to a third
person. It must be noted, however, that in the petition
upon which the alleged decree of distribution is based
that there is no allegation of a conveyan·ce by one of the
heirs to the other heirs so as to give the Court jurisdiction to make distribution to a person other than the one
upon whom the law cast the title. In the instant case it
is clear that the petition directed to the Court set forth
the alleged rights of the one heir, Virginia Latses, to
secure a transfer of all of the assets of the estate save
$10,000.00 to her by reason of the fact that she had
entered into a contract with the other heirs to accomplish that. The petition does not set forth that she is
requesting distribution to herself of all the property
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save $10,000.00 in accordance with the requirements of
Section 74-4-5. Her petition does not set forth that she
is asking for the property as the sole successor to it but
on the contrary, that she is asking for the property by
virtue of the fact that she entered into a contract subsequent to the death of the decedent to receive that property. There is no allegation in the petition that the three
non-resident heirs assigned or conveyed their interests in
the estate to her so that she could be entitled to claim
distribution of that part of the property normally distributable to the three non-resident heirs to herself by
virtue of the assignment and conveyance by the three
non-resident heirs of their interests in the estate to her.
We conclude, therefore, that because there was no
petition for distribution as required by the Probate Code
but rather a petition to obtain contractual rights which,
not being a matter of probate, passed upon without
process, was void, that there has not yet been entered a
decree of distribution in this estate. Until a de·cree of
distribution is entered, the cause of action given the the
heirs to claim their share of the estate has not arisen.
Section 75-12-8 gives the rights to the heirs to demand
and sue for and recover their respective shares from the
administrator when the decree names the persons who
are the heirs of the estate and the proportions or parts
of the estate to which each heir, as an heir, is entitled.
Until such an order is entered, the heirs do not have their
cause of action to demand and sue for and re·cover their
respective shares.
The petition filed and the order based upon the peti-
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tion were not carrying out matters of probate but were
asking the Court to adjudicate the rights of one of the
heirs as a contracting party. Such a matter is beyond the
jurisdiction of the Probate Court and such is a void
order, without the requisite service of process; that attempted proceeding was an adversary proceeding which
could have been brought as a partition proceeding if the
$10,000.00 would
single heir who took the estate,
have been willing to abide the judgment of the referees
appointed by the Court as to how the estate should be
partioned. Evidently they were not willing to bring this
matter before the Court in the manner authorized by
the Statute. They had the alternative right of proceeding
in an independent action to enforce their alleged rights
under the contract if they considered they had any, or
under our relaxed rule of presenting the matter to the
probate side of the court, but only after the service of
process to bring the parties before the court. Instead,
the heir persuaded and induced the Court to enter a judgment based upon a contract right which judgment was
directly opposite and contrary to the judgment which
the Court, should have entered. It is clear that if the rules
of law had been followed and this alleged contract submitted to a Court for its consideration in an adversary
proceeding; as it should have been, that a Court reading
the stipulation and agreement would have entered a
judgment directly opposite to the judgment entered. No
opportunity was given for an a:dversary proceeding.
Process should have been served on the three nonresident heirs or at least on their attorney to be present
at the hearing.

tfA.Yf
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Even though the October decree passed upon a
matter of probate, the order is void inasmuch as no process was served upon the other heirs, in a proceeding
brought to modify an order of court which was final and
conclusive.
This court's second opinion states as a principle of
law, "that counsel appointed to represent absent heirs
has not the power of an Attorney in F'act to bind the
heirs by his own action, though ratification of such action
by the probate court can make it binding." Accordingly,
this court of last resort in this State, establishes that the
"order approving petition and stipulation for settlement
with certain heirs" is binding upon the parties, namelyMrs. Latses on the one hand and the other four heirs on
the other hand. In this order it is recited "the court finds
the facts as set forth in the petition to be correct" and
then orders ''that the stipulation ·and petition entered into and pres en ted by and between the parties herein be,
and the same is hereby, approved and confirmed," and
"it is further ordered that the said agreement and distribution shall become binding and conclusive as to each of
the four said heirs upon the acceptance by him, or by his
heirs-at-law of said payments.
It is further ordered that the said heirs shall furnish
or that their Attorney shall procure from the said recipients of said payments, a proper re·ceipt therefor and an
assignment and relinquishment of all interest in this said
estate and a release of the administrator herein, which
receipts and relinquishments shall be delivered to the
administrator." (R. 97).
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One of the terms of the stipulation which was approved by the court reads, (R.. 87) "That the said payment and settlement shall become binding and conclusive
as to each of the four said heirs, Peter J. Latses, William
J. Latses, Nick G. Latses and J'ohn G. Latses, upon the
acceptance of his portion of the said estate and the execution of the necessary instruments to rs~'CCtherefore,
and to assign his said interest and release f1J&said estate.
That the said settle1nent shall become binding as to
each of the said heirs accepting the same and executing
such instruments." Thus the agreement was, that unless
each of the four heirs executed releases and assignments
of their interests in the estate, they were each to receive
their full distributive share allowed them by the laws of
descent. This is the converse of saying, that if they do
execute the releases and assignments, they are each to
receive only $2500.00 or that they are not to take according to the laws of descent. Thus, in addition to the statutory right to the share alloted to them by the statute of
descent, they had a contract right to their full share. Mrs.
Latses petitioned the court to give the other four contracting parties, the amount they had conditionally contracted to accept, freed from the condition of executing
the releases and assignments of their interests.
That decree of F'ebruary 27, 1947 is conclusive
upon the matters adjudicated. Generally speaking, an
adjudication as to any step iu the administration is not
subject to review in a subsequent stage of the administration., 1 Bancroft Probate Practice, 2d Ed, Page 175,
Note 15. "Intermediate decrees are often final as to mat-
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ters wl1ich p,../"0..,..,propect to be concluded thereby, " 1 B ancrof t
Probate Practice, 2d Ed, Page 167, Note 1.

~fTi416-

It is implicit that even though a decree or judgment
which adjudicates the rights of parties is called into
question or is sought to be reviewed or modified at a
later date, that process must be served upon all the parties sought to be effected by the modification. Unless
process is served, the parties to the original order have
not had their day in court on the question of whether
the original order should be modified or changed. See
Ada.ms v. Lewis, 111 Utah 387, 180 Pac. 2d 865. In that
case, the court confirmed a sale of real property for cash
and subsequently, without further notice to the heirs,
ordered that the party purchasing the property could
apply towards the purchase price, the value of a distributive share of the estate. The court held that notice was
required before the first order could be changed.
We submit that the February Order was conclusive; that there is no way to change the existing order
by a direct attack. This can be accomplished only by
serving process upon the heirs-those whose rights are
sought to be affected.
In the Latses case, there was no service on the heirs
and no service on the Court Appointed Attorney for the
heirs. Not even a copy of the petition that was filed
to undo the judgment already entered, was served upon
the Court Appointed Attorney for the heirs. How can
any Court change a properly docketed judgment of the
Court without serving any kind of process on any partyt
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POINT V.
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
Taking away the right vested in the heirs by the
February decree, without the service of a citation upon
them, constitutes the taking of property without due
process of law. That February decree is itself a decree
of distribution. It ordered that all of the property of
the estate, save $10,000.00, should be distributed to Virginia Latses, but only on condition that assignments were
executed. The inference in the order is that if the assignments were not executed, that distribution must be in
accordance with the laws of succes~sion.
The petition filed in September 1945 and upon which
is based the October order, did no~ invoke the jurisdiction of the Court to change the February order. No citation was ever served on the non-resident heirs or the
court appointed Attorney, to give them notiee of any
proceeding to change or modify that decree. The order
modifying the decree was entered without service of a
citation and therefore, constitutes the taking of property
without due process of law, contrary to the provisions of
the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. .Es17~ .t cs;;"AI iJ-al/ (/. .s. ~4/1, 61 .S.t!.tf. /2.1.3
;A-t'"

/~/t'

POINT VI.
EVEN IF THE COURT ADHERES TO ITS OPINION
THAT THE OCTOBER ORDER IS A VALID PROBATE DECREE AND CONCLUSIVE, THE NON-RESIDENT HEIRS
HAVE PLEADED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE
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AGAINST THE ADMINISTRATORS AND OF FRAUD AND
COLLUSION BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATORS ON THE
ONE HAND AND MRS. LATSES AS ONE OF THE HEIRS
ON THE OTHER HAND.

This Court has assumed that the non-resident heirs,
upon failing to reeeive their distributive share of the estate have not pleaded fraud and collusion. Paragraph 8
(R. 163) pleads that the administrators (one of whom
Mrs. Latses, was the heir taking all of the estate save
$10,000.00) had personal knowledge of the contents of
the F;ebruary order, and that it was in full force and effect and a binding court order to distribute according
to the laws of succession unless assignments of the heirs
interests were presented and filed. The petition here
passed upon further alleges (R. 165); "That the administrators and the attorney appointed by the court to tepresent the non-resident heirs knew that the distribution
to the widow of all of the assets other than the sum of
$8,000.00 was to be made only when the order of court
was complied with, namely, when each of the heirs accepted payment of the proferred settlement and after
they deeded over their interest in the real property to the
widow," and at (R. 166); "That the remaining $1,500.00
of this contemplated settlement to each non-resident heir
was never out of the posse8sion of the administrator,
the Utah Savings & Trust Company and that it well knew
that the non-resident heirs had not accepted the payment
and settlement, and had not assigned their respective interests to widow; that it had this sum in its possession
on October 9, 1945, and had not then attempted to transmit the respective sums of the additional $1,500.00 of the
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proferred settlement. That the Utah Savings & Trust
Company well knew that it was not authorized to distribute the rest of the estate to the widow unless it had receipts and assignments, but nevertheless and in violation
of the order of the court, and in collusion with the widow
who was the co-administrator of the estate, the Utah
Savings & Trust Company did distribute all of the property of the estate to her. The administrators were aware
of the fact that the said order of final distribution provided ~he remaining assets of the estate were to be
distributed to the widow only 1!1:; the payments and
distribution aforesaid. The payments and distribution
aforesaid were -never made. That the Utah Savings &
Trust Company well knew that it was impossible to corrE(>ond with the non-resident heirs at that time because
of existing guerilla warfare in Greece. That even if
it would have been possible to correspond with them,
it probably would have required at least thirty (30) days
to forward the necessary funds and to receive an acknowledgement thereof, and the necessary receipts, even if the
correspondence was carried on by air mail. That in
violation of the order of the court, and in complete disregard of the rights of the heirs, the administrators on the
very same day as the order of distribution was signed,
and without attempting to forward the proceeds of the
proferred settlement to the heirs, delivered all of the rest
of the estate excepting the· sum of $8,000.00 to the widow.
That this act of the administrators was collusive and
made in an effect to force and compel the non-resident
heirs to accept an unfair and grossly insufficient settlement."
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This proceeding is n1aintainable in this probate case,
in which the facts giving rise to the cause of action arose.
The three non resident heirs did not receive their proper
distributive share of the estate because of the negligence
of the administrators and their disregard of the courts
order of February 27, 1945. This brings the ease squarely within the rule of Tiller v. Norton, ------ Utah. _____ , 253
Pac. 2d 618 ( 1953). The rule is better set forth in the
case of Welch v. Flory, 200 Northeastern 900, 106 ALR
813. It holds that "a decree directing a distribution of
the estate does not protect the executors or administrators against the claims of persons entitled to share in the
distribution who have been omitted from the order as a
result of negligence on the part of the executors or administrators."
In Welch v. Flory, in the probate proceedings, an
order was made to correct the decree to order the administrator to make payments to the heirs of his distributive share and secondly at the same time it established
the rights of the administrator to collect the amount of
the overpayment made to each of the distributees. No
injustices to innocent third parties would result, if
proceedings were permitted in this action to accomplish
the same result. Thus, the result would be exactly what
it should have been under proper probate proceedings.
With reference to Tiller v. Norton, it is our opinion
that that case is not authority for the proposition that
an administrator can distribute less than the entire distributive share of an estate to which an heir is entitled
and be protected. It is only authority for the proposition
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that when the court record shows that there is only one
heir, when in fact there are three, the other two heirs
being unknown, that the administrator is not liable for
failing to distribute to the two unknown heirs. The case
1s completely distinguishable from the Latses case, in
that the heirs were all known and there was no element
of faci$lacking to enable the court to enter a judgment
that would completely adjudicate the rights of the parties.
We believe that the case of Short v. Thompson, 5·6
Idaho 361, 55 Pac. 2d 163, (cited in the footnote), is not
substantial authority. In this case, (at page 167 of 55
Pac. 2d) the Idaho Court seems to contemplate that the
decision would be different even in just such a case as the
Latses case. At the top of the page, just referred to, the
court cites the case of Gile v. Wood, 32 Idaho 752 at 88
Pac. 36, where the court held that a judgment. of the
court entered upon a matter upon which the jurisdiction
of the court was not invoked is a void judgment.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully urge this court to again give full
consideration to the problems raised in the several briefs
that have been filed. It is, of course, necessary that there
be an end to litigation but the end must be an equitable
one. Courts must not dispose of cases simply because the
litigation may be vexing. This case has only been before
this court on the pleadings and it has not had a long judicial history. It is true that some 7 or 8 years elapsed
hetween the entry of the order of October 1945 and the
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commencement of these pleadings. That, however, is no
reason to reject the efforts of these non-resident heirs
to secure just treatment in the courts of this State.
The Court's opinion on rehearing may be more far
reaching than can be comprehended at the moment. For
example-A & B, the two heirs of an estate being prObated in San Juan County are entitled to undivided onehalf interests in uranium claims, Nos. 1 to 10 inclusive
and they make an agreement between themselves that A
should take claims No. 1, 2 and 3 and B the remaining
7 claims and such agreement is approved by the Court
and provided that this agreement was to be effective only
if A would execute assignments to B and B would execute
assignments to A. It is then found that claims 1, 2, and
3 are productive and claims 4 to 10 inclusive are wholly
unproductive. B is out in the mountains working the
productive claims and stay3 away from his home in
Monticello for a full year. He knows that he has not
executed any assignments of his interest in these produCtive claims 1, 2 and 3 and he assumes that he has a onehalf undivided interest in these claims. A, the administrator petitioned the court to distribute the estate, alleging in the petition that an agreement has been made and
approved by the court by which A is to receive claims
1, 2, and 3 and B the remaining claims. H doesn't plead
nor prove that B executed the assignments. A ten day
statutory notice of the hearing of the petition is mailed
to B's home, but there is no one there to receive it. Nevertheless, the court on A's petition distribute·s the valuable
claims, 1, 2, and 3 to A and the worthless claims 4 to 10
inclusive to B.
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One year later B returns from the mountains where
he has mined $1,000,000.00 worth of ore from the claims
1, 2 and 3 and finds that a decree of distribution was
entered distributing the three valuable claims to A and
the 7 worthless claims to B. Is this decree to he held
conclusive against B and deprive him of his one-half
undivided interest in the good claims~ Title to an undivided one-half interest in these good claims vested in
him upon the death of his aneestor. There was no proceeding to divest him of his title. 'Such an opinion as the
second opinion in this case would uphold the distribution of the good claims to A and thus take his property
from him without due process of law.
We respectfully submit that that is what happened
in the Latses case. If this opinion of the court is permitted to stand, that type of a prohate proceeding will
be sustained in the Latses case and is likely to be sustained in many future probate cases. Of course, it can be
said that when another such case is presented, the court
could. over-rule the decision in the Latses case, but that
is tantamount to this court applying sound principles of
law to one case and not to another, making the principle
of "stare decisis" useless.
Respectfully submitted,
WIDTE, ARNOVITZ & S.MITH
GUSTIN, RICHARDS. &
MATTS SON
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RELEASE OF MORTGAGE

The un0ersigned 1 Virginia Latsis, hereby represents
and declares

tr~t

that certain mortgage between Peter Latsis

and Hattie Latsis, his wife, as
~ortgagee,

mortga~ors,

to James Latsis,

recorded November 5, 1931 in Book "91", page 294,

as Entry No. 685741, in the records of the County Recorder ot
Salt Lake County was, by general decree, in the matter of the
~state

of James John Latsis, No. 25644 in the District Court ot

the Third Judicial District,..in and for Salt Lake County, dis·
tributed to the said undersigned, and she is the holder and

o~•

thereof.
The said James John Latsis was the same person as Jamee
Latsis, the said mortgagee.
The property described in said

mort~ge

is situate

~

Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and described as follows:
Beginning
corner of
Salt Lake
East 49.4
49.4 Rods
10 acres,

at a point 65.? Rods East from the Northwest
Section 34, Township 2 South, Range l West,
Meridian, thence South 32.4 Rods, thence
Rods, thence North 32.4 Rods, thence Weat
to the place of beginning. Containing
more or less.

The undersigned further acknowledges that the said
mortgaee hes been fully paid and satisfied, and the same is
hereby released and discharged.

7

~
STATE OF UTAH
•• ,

CO~Y

~ ./:~·:or.·::~J~-/-·.,..

ss •

OF SALT LAKE
on the /

t 5day

of

~

, 1945, personally app.-

~ :·.; U U L be.ko~e me VIRGIN!Al:"ATSIS, t &~gner ot the foregoing inatn• ;'' ~.~~IS$~~_;
whO duly acknowledged to me that 8he executed the S&mlo
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C!!erttftrntt
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

I

ss.

I, Hazel Taggart Chase, Recorder in and for the County of Salt Lake, State of
Utah, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and correct copy of the original
......!1~1.~9-~ft... Q.f. .. ~~Qr.:t;..eai!'.e ...-:-: .. Y.5.r.r..i.n1a...1~.t~.i~... f.or...:!eme.~.. .!J£t.~.ie... t.Q...P.e.:t~.r...anct ...Ha.ttie.. JJ.at.aia...~

No ........10.63.7.25................................... , as appears of record in my office.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand
and affixed my official seal, this ......l2tb.................. day
of............... ?.~P.:It~.~J?.~r.............................. , A. D. 19..~.l ............. .
HAZEL TAGGART CHASE. COUNTY RECORDER

............................... Deputy Recorder
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